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Intelligence in Aristotle's Treatise On the Soul (De Anima) - Henry Kahl In his treatiseOn the Soul(DeAnima) Aristotle claims that human beings are the "most intelligent of animals" because they have the most precise sense of touch (DA2.9, 421a23). But he does not explain what it is about the sense of touch that makes humans so intelligent. Some commentators claim that our precise sense of touch makes us better at grasping concepts, which in turn makes us better reasoners. But in my paper, I argue that having a precise sense of touch does not make humans more rational. Rather, I claim that humans are the most intelligent of animals, according to Aristotle, because they are able to discriminate between objects of perception better than other animals. This interpretation of intelligence digresses from commentators' conventional understanding of intelligence as the ability to reason, i.e., understand an object's essence. I support my thesis by first, outlining the link between intelligence and tactile perception in DA 2.9. Second, I explain how the texture of an animal's flesh impacts their perceptual ability. And finally, I show that touch underlies all other perceptual capacities, which is why having a precise sense of touch makes human beings better at discriminating all sensible objects. Perception, Desire, and Imagination in Aristotle's Treatise On the Soul (De Anima) - Luke Sandmann This presentation addresses a seemingly inconsistent triad in Aristotle's De Anima. In his account of the souls of animals, Aristotle stipulates that because all animals have the ability to perceive, they necessarily have the capacity to desire. He further claims that whatever has desire has imagination. Elsewhere, Aristotle states that only some animals have imagination. All three of these claims cannot be true. I arguethat the third presumption is incorrect: Aristotle believes that all animals do in fact have some level of imagination. I will defend this assertion by showing that in specific passages where Aristotle claims only some animals have imagination, he is talking about determinate imagination. According to Aristotle, this type of imagination is an aid to perception in its ability to recast prior impressions, providing a more specific depiction of our objects of perception. This is the type of imagination common to all animals with sensory abilities beyond touch. Conversely, indeterminate imagination is extremely limited and belongs to animals with the sense of touch alone. While these two types of imagination have key differences, the two will be collectively exhaustive in animals. With this, the consistency of Aristotle's triad can be preserved by confirming the presence of perception, desire, and imagination in all animals. Aristotle's Account on the Inseparability of the Body and Soul Due to the Faculty of Imagination - Hallie Altwies In his treatise, On the Soul (De Anima), Aristotle claims that every affection of the soul seems to require the body with one possible exception: reasoning. He claims that reason is the one affection of the soul that may not involve the body and would therefore be distinct from the body. If reasoning does not require the body, then there is at least one part of the soul that is separable from the body and can survive the death of the body. However, Aristotle states that if reason requires the faculty of imagination, which is an affection of the body, then reason too would be an affection of the soul that requires the body. Thus, if imagination requires the body in order to persist, and imagination is a condition of reasoning, then it can be assumed that reasoning also requires the body. Thus, the most pressing issue in interpreting Aristotle's assessment of the separability of mind and body is deciding whether or not reasoning requires imagination in order to operate. In the paper, I argue that imagination is indeed a condition of reasoning due to the fact that we must form imaginative associations in order to conceive any object that is grasped through perception.
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KAHL, HENRY A Critical Examination of Susan Wolf’s Rejection of Common-Sense Moral Sainthood ADVISER: Dr. Krisanna Scheiter In Susan Wolf’s paper <em>Moral Saints</em>, she describes a figure whose actions strictly seek to improve welfare on individual and societal levels, namely a common-sense moral saint. If universally adopted, common-sense moral sainthood would presumably dramatically reduce the amount of suffering exhibited in our world, yet at the expense of developing the world’s nonmoral elements. Conversely, if all individuals were to pursue both moral and nonmoral ends, their dualistic approach would develop the world’s nonmoral elements, yet at the expense of sizable, permitted suffering. However, according to Wolf, individuals should not become common-sense moral saints, for common-sense moral sainthood is not an optimal personal ideal. By dismissing common-sense moral sainthood, Wolf may implicitly advocate that a world in which individuals pursue moral and nonmoral ends is valuable enough to justify the resulting suffering. Therefore, in my paper, I argue that to strengthen Wolf’s rejection of common-sense moral sainthood, she must justify why a world defined by a rich development of and appreciation for the nonmoral is superior to a world practically free of suffering. I support my thesis by first outlining Wolf’s account of common-sense moral sainthood. Second, I discern the pivotal implication of Wolf’s rejection of common-sense moral sainthood. Finally, I construct a thought experiment in which I demonstrate the observable differences between a world in which everyone pursues strictly moral ends and a world in which everyone pursues moral and nonmoral ends. KAHL, HENRY Animal Intelligence in Aristotle’s <em>De Anima</em> ADVISER: Dr. Krisanna Scheiter In his treatise <em>On the Soul </em>(<em>De Anima</em>), Aristotle claims that human beings are the “most intelligent of animals” because they have the most precise sense of touch (<em>DA</em> 2.9, 421a23). But he does not explain what it is about the sense of touch that makes humans so intelligent. Some commentators claim that our precise sense of touch improves our ability to capture an object’s essence, which in turn makes us better reasoners. However, in my paper, I argue that having a precise sense of touch does not necessarily make humans more rational. Rather, I claim that, according to Aristotle, humans are the most intelligent animals because they can better discriminate between perceptible objects in comparison to other animals. This interpretation of intelligence digresses from commentator’s conventional understanding of intelligence as the ability to reason, i.e., grasp an object’s essence. I support my thesis by first exploring the relationship between delicate flesh and tactile perceptual ability. Second, I examine touch’s underlying involvement in sensory modalities other than touch. Third, I discern how enhanced tactile perception permits an improved perception of both common and co-incidental perceptible objects. Finally, I demonstrate how a precise sense of touch does not necessarily improve a human’s ability to capture an object’s essence.
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