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Intelligence in Aristotle's Treatise On the Soul (De Anima) - Henry Kahl In his treatiseOn the Soul(DeAnima) Aristotle claims that human beings are the "most intelligent of animals" because they have the most precise sense of touch (DA2.9, 421a23). But he does not explain what it is about the sense of touch that makes humans so intelligent. Some commentators claim that our precise sense of touch makes us better at grasping concepts, which in turn makes us better reasoners. But in my paper, I argue that having a precise sense of touch does not make humans more rational. Rather, I claim that humans are the most intelligent of animals, according to Aristotle, because they are able to discriminate between objects of perception better than other animals. This interpretation of intelligence digresses from commentators' conventional understanding of intelligence as the ability to reason, i.e., understand an object's essence. I support my thesis by first, outlining the link between intelligence and tactile perception in DA 2.9. Second, I explain how the texture of an animal's flesh impacts their perceptual ability. And finally, I show that touch underlies all other perceptual capacities, which is why having a precise sense of touch makes human beings better at discriminating all sensible objects. Perception, Desire, and Imagination in Aristotle's Treatise On the Soul (De Anima) - Luke Sandmann This presentation addresses a seemingly inconsistent triad in Aristotle's De Anima. In his account of the souls of animals, Aristotle stipulates that because all animals have the ability to perceive, they necessarily have the capacity to desire. He further claims that whatever has desire has imagination. Elsewhere, Aristotle states that only some animals have imagination. All three of these claims cannot be true. I arguethat the third presumption is incorrect: Aristotle believes that all animals do in fact have some level of imagination. I will defend this assertion by showing that in specific passages where Aristotle claims only some animals have imagination, he is talking about determinate imagination. According to Aristotle, this type of imagination is an aid to perception in its ability to recast prior impressions, providing a more specific depiction of our objects of perception. This is the type of imagination common to all animals with sensory abilities beyond touch. Conversely, indeterminate imagination is extremely limited and belongs to animals with the sense of touch alone. While these two types of imagination have key differences, the two will be collectively exhaustive in animals. With this, the consistency of Aristotle's triad can be preserved by confirming the presence of perception, desire, and imagination in all animals. Aristotle's Account on the Inseparability of the Body and Soul Due to the Faculty of Imagination - Hallie Altwies In his treatise, On the Soul (De Anima), Aristotle claims that every affection of the soul seems to require the body with one possible exception: reasoning. He claims that reason is the one affection of the soul that may not involve the body and would therefore be distinct from the body. If reasoning does not require the body, then there is at least one part of the soul that is separable from the body and can survive the death of the body. However, Aristotle states that if reason requires the faculty of imagination, which is an affection of the body, then reason too would be an affection of the soul that requires the body. Thus, if imagination requires the body in order to persist, and imagination is a condition of reasoning, then it can be assumed that reasoning also requires the body. Thus, the most pressing issue in interpreting Aristotle's assessment of the separability of mind and body is deciding whether or not reasoning requires imagination in order to operate. In the paper, I argue that imagination is indeed a condition of reasoning due to the fact that we must form imaginative associations in order to conceive any object that is grasped through perception.
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Perception, Imagination, and Desire in Aristotle’s <em>De Anima</em>: Advisor: Krisanna Scheiter Readers of Aristotle have been perplexed by a seemingly inconsistent triad presented in Aristotle’s treatise on the soul. In short, Aristotle seems to claim that all animals that perceive necessarily have the capacity for desire. Next, those that desire have the capacity for imagination. The perplexity arises when Aristotle seems to say that not all perceptual organisms have the capacity for imagination. All three of these claims cannot be true. I take a nuanced approach to the reconciliation of this seeming inconsistency by interpreting Aristotle as attributing imagination to all animals. I do so by providing a comprehensive analysis of Aristotle’s account of imagination, concluding that all perceptual organisms require imagination to explain appearances. In instances where Aristotle denies imagination to “grubs”, we can rest assured that these animals are simply in the early stages of cognitive development. Thus, I find the triad reconciled by an attribution of perception, desire, and imagination to all perceptual organisms. Passion, Taste, and Hume’s Sensible Knave: Advisor: Maité Cruz Tleugabulova This paper looks to offer an answer to the long-standing question of Hume’s Sensible Knave. The Sensible Knave is a character introduced by Hume in his <em>Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals</em>. This individual is offered by Hume in anticipation of a challenge to his theory of justice. Hume believes that justice is an artifice implemented for the purpose of a functional society. We come to approve of it through education as a moral virtue that is learned. The Sensible Knave recognizes this and takes advantage of all the scenarios in which they can commit injustice for self-interested profit without being caught. Therefore, they seem to pose no threat to the fabric of justice. This is a problem for Hume because he is a sentimentalist; we come to know an act or character as virtuous due to the pleasure it invokes in us. Therefore, if the Knave does not feel inclined by his moral sentiment to commit himself to justice, has he found a loophole in Hume’s theory? Hume answers that he has sacrificed the superior pleasure of moral integrity for material amusements. Critics state that Hume cannot account for this claim, as sentimentalism seems to be a subjective theory—who is judge that one pleasure is superior to another? My paper looks to show that Hume can, in fact, account for this claim through his articulation of the True Judge. The True Judge is a theoretical persona with fine-tuned taste by which we can confirm or deny sentiments. With this articulation in place, Hume can preserve his theory of justice.
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